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Introduction
In this paper we develop a general theoretical framework to analyze dynamic games in which players employ ambiguity as strategy to in ‡uence the outcome of a game 1 . We build on previous work by Riedel and Sass (2013) who study normal form games with objective ambiguity. As the authors conceptualize it, each player can create objective ambiguity by setting up an Ellsberg urn (i.e., an urn where the exact composition of balls of di¤erent colors is not known) and conditioning her strategy choice on a draw from this urn. In this paper, we extend this approach to …nite extensive games in which players are allowed to choose compact and convex sets of mixed strategies. Such strategies are called Ellsberg strategies and games where players employ such strategies are called Ellsberg games (hence, the title of the paper). In our setting, players possess objective but imprecise information which we model by using sets of probability distributions over possible outcomes of a game. As shown by Gajdos et al. (2008) , in such an environment each player's preferences can be represented by the minimal expected utility evaluated with respect to all possible probability distributions over the outcomes of a game.
Our …rst contribution is a version of Kuhn's Theorem for extensive-form games. 2 More precisely, we show that for each Ellsberg strategy satisfying a "rectangularity" condition there exists an outcome-and payo¤-equivalent Ellsberg behavioral strategy, and vice versa. The rectangularity condition that we impose can be regarded as a generalization of the familiar condition used in the standard analysis which establishes the relationship between behavioral and mixed strategies. Speci…cally, with an Ellsberg strategy satisfying this condition, a player 1 In his paper on peace negotiations between two countries seeking to end the continuing military confrontation, Greenberg (2000) argues that the best strategy for the mediator is to "remain silent"regarding its policy to impose sanctions in case the negotiations break down. More recently, in his study of the Two China Problem D'Amato (2010) …nds that the US deliberately relied on strategic ambiguity to deter China from using force against Taiwan. In particular, by signing the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, which was neither a treaty nor a nontreaty, it actually left the two sides guessing at its willingness to intervene in a con ‡ict. In a similar vein, the literature on communication provides numerous examples where agents pursuing con ‡icting goals opt to be vague or imprecise in their statements. As Eisenberg (1984) puts it: "Many di¤erent strategies are used to orient toward con ‡icting interactional goals; some examples include avoiding interaction altogether, remaining silent, or changing the topic." 2 Kuhn's Theorem states that mixed and behavioral strategies are equivalent (in the sense that they induce the same probability distribution over outcomes of a game) if and only if the game satis…es perfect recall.
evaluates her ex ante expected utility by minimizing separately the conditional expectations on each of her information sets and then minimizing the expectation of these conditional expectations. Since, with an Ellsberg behavioral strategy, she evaluates her expected utility in exactly the same way, both strategies yield identical ex ante payo¤s.
In contrast to Kuhn's Theorem, our proof does not rely on the notion of perfect recall. The reason is as follows. In Kuhn's setting, this property ensures that for every mixed strategy there exists a behavioral strategy which induces identical probability distribution over terminal nodes. In our setting, it is the rectangularity condition that plays a similar role. More precisely, if an Ellsberg strategy is rectangular then it comprises only those mixed strategies that can be replicated by behavioral strategies.
Our second main result is that dynamic consistency associated with the requirement that all players respect their ex ante contingent choices with the evolution of play generally does not hold in Ellsberg games even if they satisfy perfect recall. A similar point is made by Aryal and Stauber (2013) in their note on Kuhn's Theorem with ambiguity averse players. In particular, they provide an example of a three-player extensive game in which it is impossible to achieve dynamic consistency if one assumes consistency and independency of ambiguous beliefs/strategies across the players. Although their example is instructive, it does not fully capture the role of perfect recall in ensuring dynamic consistency. In this paper, we focus on this issue and show by means of examples that dynamic consistency may be violated even in (two-player) extensive games satisfying perfect recall.
Our third main result is that, in order to achieve dynamic consistency, the extensive game must satisfy further restrictions beyond those implied by perfect recall. One restriction implies that every time when a player is called upon to move she needs to make a conjecture about the actions of only one of her opponents who moved at the immediately preceding stage. 3 Another restriction implies that in doing so she can disregard everything what happened before that stage. We show that if the game satis…es those restrictions then dynamic consistency can be restored by suitably choosing the pro…le of ambiguous strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce notation 3 Note that this condition is stronger than the one of perfect recall because it requires a player to remember not only what she did but also what her opponents did before the previous period. and de…nitions. In Section 3, we prove a version of Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games. In Section 4, we give examples of Ellsberg games satisfying perfect recall in which dynamic consistency cannot be achieved. We use these examples to justify the restrictions that we impose on the ambiguous strategies and the structure of a game in order to ensure dynamic consistency. In Section 5, we o¤er concluding remarks.
Notation and De…nitions
We …nd it convenient to employ the tree-based de…nition of extensive game which was originally introduced by Kuhn (1953) and, recently, has been adopted in a number of related studies. 4 Formally, an extensive game comprises the following constituents.
A …nite rooted tree hT ; !; t 0 i which speci…es the order of moves. Here, T denotes a …nite collection of nodes, t 0 2 T is the root, and for any t 0 ; t 00 2 T ; the relation t 0 ! t 00 means that t 0 is immediate predecessor of t 00 or t 00 is immediate successor of t 0 : A path from node t 0 to node t 00 is a sequence (t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) of nodes starting at t 1 = t 0 and ending at t n = t 00 such that t k is immediate successor of t k 1 for all k = 2; : : : ; n. We denote by the precedence relation on T with t 0 t 00 if there is a path from t 0 to t 00 : We call then t 0 a predecessor of t 00 : As usual, t 0 -t 00 means t 0 = t 00 or t 0 t 00 : Recall that the precedence relation is a well-ordered partial order ; each node t 2 T (except t 0 ) has exactly one immediate predecessor and the set of predecessors is linearly ordered. The nodes that are not predecessors of any other nodes are called terminal nodes, and the set of these nodes is denoted by Z: Each terminal node z induces a unique path z from the root to z; such paths are called plays. We also denote by X T nZ the set of decision nodes.
A set of players N = f1; :::; N g and a partition of X into subsets X 1 ; :::; X N where each X i denotes the set of player i's decision nodes.
An equivalence relation de…ned on the product spaces X i X i such that for x 0 x 00 2 X i then the number of immediate successors of x 0 is equal 4 See, for example, Brandenburger (2007) and Bonnano (2004 The equivalence relation allows us to further partition each X i into subsets called information sets. We denote by H i the partition of X i and by H i 2 H i a typical information set of player i:
A choice partition which partitions the branches out of nodes in a given information set of a player into that player's choices in that information set. We write x 0 ! c x 00 if c is the action or choice that leads from x 0 to its immediate successor x 00 . The choice partition satis…es the following two conditions: (i) if x 0 ! c t and x 00 ! c t then x 0 = x 00 ; and (ii) if x 0 ! c t 0 and x 00 i x 0 then there exists t 00 such that x 00 ! c t 00 : We denote by C(H i ) the set of choices available at the information set H i :
A player i's payo¤ associated with each terminal node which is represented by a function u i : Z ! R (where R is the set of real numbers).
As is common in the literature, we shall consider only those extensive games in which every decision node has at least two outgoing branches, and in which no path from the root to a terminal node crosses any information set more than once. In the latter case, we require the game to satisfy the so called 'no absentmindedness' condition. Formally, it states:
(NAM) If x 0 x 00 and x 0 -x 00 then x 0 = x 00 for all x 0 ; x 00 2 X :
Within the class of extensive games that we consider, it will prove useful to distinguish the games which satisfy perfect recall. This property, which was …rst introduced by Kuhn (1953) , requires that no player ever forgets what she knew and what she did in the past. Formally, the game is of perfect recall if (PR) For every player k 2 N ; for all nodes x 1 ; x 0 1 ; x 0 2 2 X k and t 1 2 T and for every choice c; if x 1 ! c t 1 ; t 1 -x 0 1 and x 0 1 x 0 2 then there exists nodes x 2 2 X k and t 2 2 T such that x 2 x 1 ; x 2 ! c t 2 and t 2 -x 0 2 :
We now turn to the de…nitions of strategies.
De…nition 1 A pure strategy of player i is a function s i that maps player i's information sets into choices available at those sets such that
We write s i (H i ) = c if s i speci…es that player i makes a choice c at H i : The set of pure strategies of player i is given by
De…nition 2 A mixed strategy of player i is a probability distribution i on S i so that i (s i ) is the probability of playing s i 2 S i :
De…nition 3 A behavioral strategy of player i is a function i that assigns to each H i 2 H i a probability distribution H i over the set of choices available at H i :
Let (A) denote the set of all probability distributions on some set A: The set of player i's mixed strategies is then given by (S i ) while the set of player i's behavioral strategies is given by
Denote by P z ( i ; i ) the probability of reaching a terminal node z 2 Z induced by the strategy pro…le ( i ; i ): 5
De…nition 4
The strategies 0 i and 00 i are equivalent if P z ( 0 i ; i ) = P z ( 00 i ; i ) for all z 2 Z and all i 2 j 6 = i (S j ):
The de…nition thus states that two (mixed) strategies of player i are equivalent if they induce the same probability distribution over terminal nodes regardless of how the opponents play.
Denote by z the path from the root t 0 to a terminal node z 2 Z: Note that for the class of games that we consider every strategy pro…le s (s 1 :::; s N ) 2 i 2 N S i induces a unique z: This allows us to state the following de…nitions.
De…nition 5 Given a play z; the strategy s i 2 S i is compatible with z if there exists s i 2 S i such that the pro…le (s i ; s i ) induces z: De…nition 6 Given information set H i 2 H i ; the strategy s i is compatible with H i if there exists s i 2 S i such that the path induced by the pro…le (s i ; s i ) passes through node x 2 H i :
For each player i denote by S H i the set of pure strategies that are compatible with H i and by S H i (c) the set of pure strategies that are compatible with H i and c 2 C(H i ); i.e.,
For given probability distribution i 2 (S i ); de…ne the probability H i which is the restriction of i on S H i ; i.e.,
and the probability H i (c) which is the restriction of i on S H i (c); i.e.,
Also, for H i > 0; de…ne the probability
If H i = 0 then the information set H i is a "null event" in the sense that it will never be reached regardless of the strategies chosen by player i's opponents.
In this case, the conditional probability H i (c) cannot be derived from the initial probability distribution i : Nevertheless, this feature does not a¤ect our results since what matters for the analysis is the strategies chosen by player i at the information sets that can occur with strictly positive probabilities. We thus take H i to be the uniform distribution over available choices in this case.
The following example illustrates these concepts.
Example 1.
Consider the game-tree in Figure 1 . 6 Suppose that, by the rules of the game, player 1 is allowed to move at x 1 and x 3 while player 2 is allowed to move at x 2 ; x 4 and x 5 : In which case, player 1's information sets are given by H 11 = fx 1 g and H 12 = fx 3 g while player 2's information sets are given by 
which completes the discussion.
Following the approach of Riedel and Sass (2013), we allow each player to condition her strategy choice on the realization of an ambiguous randomization device such as an Ellsberg urn. Formally, we state: 7
De…nition 7 An Ellsberg strategy of player i is a compact and convex set i (S i ):
The de…nition thus implies that each element i 2 i is a mixed strategy of 
A rectangular set i can be constructed by, …rst, specifying the set H i for every H i 2 H i and, then, using recursively (1)-(3) to determine the relationship between the corresponding probability measures so as to satisfy the rectangularity condition.
An alternative way to de…ne a rectangular Ellsberg strategy could rely on the event-based approach proposed by Epstein and Schneider (2003) to modeling ambiguous beliefs. Speci…cally, one could view an extensive game as an eventtree in which each event is represented by a subset of the set of pure strategies compatible with a choice at some information set. The interpretation is that a player does not observe the strategy chosen as the realization of a draw from an
Ellsberg urn; what she observes is the choices made at the information sets which allow her to re…ne the knowledge of the strategy actually played. In this setting, the information structure would be represented by the …ltration fJ H i g H i 2 H i where
and a rectangular set i could be constructed by specifying the sets of one-step-ahead distributions for each
Although such a speci…cation is equivalent to our speci…cation of H i 's and both approaches yield identical rectangular sets i 's (if player i has perfect recall), we
do not pursue such a de…nition because it relies on the notion of "time line"along 8 If
can be speci…ed arbitrarily. In particular, it can be set equal to b H i which corresponds to some b i 2 i that induces b H i > 0: In this case, the requirement that the combination which the information sets can be ordered. While other approaches to de…ne the rectangularity condition for Ellsberg strategies are possible, we view our approach as the most parsimonious departure from the standard analysis under expected utility maximization, which relies on condition (3) to establish the relationship between mixed and behavioral strategies.
In particular, by analogy with the standard analysis, we allow each player i to employ stochastically independent Ellsberg urns governing her choices at each of her information sets instead of employing a unique Ellsberg urn governing her choice of a mixed strategy (associated with the strategic form of the extensive game). Formally, we state:
De…nition 9 An Ellsberg behavioral strategy of player i is a function that assigns to each information set H i 2 H i a compact and convex set
The de…nition thus implies that player i's Ellsberg behavioral strategy is the
As we explained in the Introduction, our modeling approach captures the idea of introducing objective ambiguity in a setting of strategic interaction. Players' preferences in such an environment have been characterized by Gajdos et al. (2008) who show that in case of strict ambiguity aversion they can be represented by the utility functionals in the spirit of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . In our gametheoretical setting, this means that each player i evaluates her expected utility not only with respect to the worst probability distribution induced by her opponents' ambiguous strategy pro…le i but also with respect to the worst probability distribution induced by her own ambiguous strategy i ; i.e., her expected utility is given by 9
where E i ; i is the expectation operator associated with the probability distributions i and i : 10 The following de…nition captures the notion of relative amounts of ambiguity associated with playing the strategies 0 i and 00 i :
De…nition
Note that we do not have a natural notion of outcome distribution in our Knightian setting; we thus de…ne Ellsberg strategies to be outcome equivalent if their minimal payo¤s do not depend on the particular terminal payo¤s.
Version of Kuhn' s Theorem
In his seminal paper, Kuhn (1953) establishes the relationship between mixed and behavioral strategies for …nite extensive games. More precisely, he proves the following result.
Theorem (Kuhn, 1953 ). An extensive game satis…es (PR) if and only if, for any mixed strategy i of every player i 2 N there exists an outcome equivalent behavioral strategy i ; and vice versa.
In this section, we generalize Kuhn's Theorem to extensive form Ellsberg games with ambiguity averse players. We proceed by stating two preliminary results. convex hull of cl( i); then we must have (using that E i ; i [ui(z)] is a linear function of i and
for every i 2 
while if j 6 = i then e H jk (c jk ) is determined by j : Since condition (NAM) implies that no information set can appear more than once along any path from the root to a terminal node, we have
where
Consider now the mixed strategy i which assigns to the pure strategy
This strategy is well de…ned, since (using Using (9); we have
It can be veri…ed that the set of player i's pure strategies which are compatible with z is \
Thus, by using (10) and applying a similar argument as before, we have
It remains to show that i is an element of the rectangular Ellsberg strategy i : Note …rst that i (s i ) can be written as (again, using
Using the above condition, we have respectively. De…ne the rectangular Ellsberg strategy
It is straightforward to verify that for each 1 2 B 1 there exists 1 2 1 which induces identical probabilities of reaching each z 2 Z: In Figure 2 , the projection of the set 1 onto the ( 1 (s AE ); 1 (s AF )) plane is illustrated by the area QT KM; and the set B H 2 is represented by the thick black line connecting the points (1 F ; F ) and (1
Consider now the set b 1 represented by the shaded area QY KW in Figure 2 .
This set is not rectangular: even though for any 1 Proof. Fix a path z from the root to a terminal node z 2 Z: Suppose that z crosses the information sets H j1 ; :::; H jK j that belong to player j where K j 1
for j = i and K j 0 for j 6 = i: Denote by c jk the choice of player j at H jk such that the branch associated with c jk is contained in z:
Choose i 2 i and i 2 i : For given i and i ; de…ne the probability e H jk (c jk ) that player j chooses c jk at H jk : Note that, since the Ellsberg strategy i is rectangular, then there exist H i 2 H i and
; while if j 6 = i then e H jk (c jk ) is determined by j : Condition (NAM) implies that no information set can appear more than once along any path from the root to a terminal node.
Thus, the probability of reaching any terminal node z 2 Z is equal to
where P z ( i ) is given by (8):
By applying a similar argument as before, it can be shown that
for any i 2 B i ; i 2 i and all z 2 Z: This completes the proof.
Once again, it is worth emphasizing the role of the rectangularity condition since in case of expected utility maximization an analogous result is obtained under the assumption of perfect recall. In particular, if an extensive game does not satisfy perfect recall then there are mixed strategies that cannot be generated by either behavioral strategy, i.e., they cannot be represented as the product of the marginal probability and the conditional probability : As De…nition 8 implies, our rectangularity condition guarantees that such representation holds always true. This is because it requires considering only those mixed strategies which can be decomposed in terms of marginals and conditionals. Consequently, the assumption of perfect recall becomes super ‡uous in this case. To see this more
clearly, consider the following example. egy cannot be generated by either behavioral strategy. However, it cannot belong to any rectangular set 2 either because it cannot be decomposed into marginal and conditional probabilities.
We now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.
Suppose that an extensive game satis…es (NAM) and the strategy pro…le i is given. Then, for any rectangular Ellsberg strategy i there exists an outcome and payo¤ equivalent behavioral Ellsberg strategy B i ; and vice versa.
Proof. Choose the rectangular Ellsberg strategy i and the behavioral Ellsberg strategy B i such that B H i = H i for every H i 2 H i : As shown in the proof of Theorem 1, the strategy i is then more ambiguous than the strategy
Likewise, as shown in the proof of Theorem 2, the strategy B i is then more ambiguous than the strategy i im-
Taken together, the two conditions yield
Theorem 3 thus states that rectangular Ellsberg strategies and behavioral Ellsberg strategies are payo¤-equivalent. Note however that this result applies only to the ex ante choice of these strategies and, therefore, it cannot guarantee that a player will respect this choice during the course of play. We address this issue in the following section.
Dynamic (in)consistency
It is well established in the literature that dynamic consistency may not hold in settings where decision maker's preferences conform to the multiple priors model.
One solution to this problem is proposed by Epstein and Schneider (2003) who
show that dynamic consistency can be restored if decision maker's beliefs about the overall uncertainty satisfy a certain rectangularity condition. 12 Literally speaking, this condition requires that the initial set of priors can be constructed by recursively combining all conditional and marginal probabilities corresponding to the information available at each point of time. The key di¤erence of our setting from the one developed by Epstein and Schneider is that each player's beliefs are represented by the opponents'ambiguous strategies which are assumed to be chosen independently. Given such an assumption, we can ask whether it is possible to construct the system of beliefs/strategies satisfying the rectangularity condition identi…ed by Epstein and Schneider in extensive games with perfect recall.
We begin with the example which demonstrates that this may not be possible to do if one maintains the assumption that players choose their strategies in a non-cooperative way.
Example 2. Consider the game in Figure 3 in which each player has perfect recall. In this game, player 1 moves at the information sets H 11 and H 12 while players 2 and 3 move at the information set H 21 and H 31 ; respectively. Suppose 1 2 The consistency property in dynamic choice situations appears extensively in the literature. For example, in a setting where a single decision maker faces multi-stage decision problems, Sarin and Wakker (1998) illustrate how consistency can be preserved for a class of nonexpected utility models. Using a somewhat similar approach but focusing on …nancial trading, Riedel (2004) shows that consistency in risk assessment can be achieved if risk measures satisfy the axioms of coherence and the axiom of dynamic consistency. that the Ellsberg behavioral strategies of players 2 and 3 are given by
Thus, if upon arriving at H 11 player 1 chooses b with probability one, the set of the induced probabilities AF ; AE and B corresponding to the events that the play will continue along the paths AF; AE and B is given by
In Figure 4 , this set is represented by the trapezium V QSU (for the case E < A E ):
To show that player 1 is not dynamically consistent (i.e., her ex ante choice at H 12 is di¤erent from the one that she actually makes upon arriving at this set), it su¢ ces to establish that the set is not rectangular relative to the information …ltration F (F 1 ; F 2 ) where F 1 = ffAE; AF; Bgg and F 2 = ffAEg; fAF; Bgg:
Denote by 
:
In Figure 4 , the set u is given by the thick black segment of the line having slope 1: Next, as it has been noticed by Epstein and Schneider (2002) , in order to construct a rectangular set of priors that induces u ; the marginal probability of reaching H 12 can be speci…ed in an arbitrary way. Since this probability is equal to 1 AE ; we can write the rectangular set of priors as
In Figure 4 , this set is represented by the trapezium P T Y J which includes the trapezium V QSU (i.e., the set ) and the four triangles V T Q; QY S; SJU and U P V: The …gure makes it clear that the rectangularity condition necessarily fails in this example.
Remark: Our conclusion would continue to hold if instead of having two players moving at H 21 and H 31 we had a single player employing stochastically independent ambiguous randomization devices at those information sets.
Example 2 shows that dynamic consistency implicit in Kuhn's Theorem cannot be achieved in every extensive game with imperfect information even if it satis…es perfect recall. 13 Given that each player's information …ltration is induced by the structure of the game, we can ask whether it is possible to derive restrictions on the structure of the game so that dynamic consistency can be implemented by suitably choosing the pro…le of ambiguous strategies.
As Example 2 suggests, this may be impossible to do in games in which the information structure requires a player to form beliefs over the histories of play in some information set by using the probability distributions over her opponents' actions in more than one information set. To rule out such situations, we impose the following condition ('RI'stands for 'Relevant Information'):
(RI) For each player k 6 = l; all nodes x 0 ; x 00 2 X k and x 2 X l and for every choice c 0 ; if x ! c 0 x 0 and x 0 x 00 then there exists a choice c 00 such that x ! c 00 x 00 :
The above condition states that every node in player k's information set is an immediate successor of the same node in player l's information set. By analogy with the temporal precedence relation over nodes, we can say that this condition induces a temporal precedence relation over information sets in the following sense:
set H l is an immediate predecessor of set H k or set H k is immediate successor of set H l if there exists node x 2 H l which is an immediate predecessor of every node in H k :
Note also that recursively applying this condition to all information sets of each player yields that any two paths ending at player k's information set must pass through the same sequence of nodes of that player and contain identical actions at all such nodes. This in turn implies that player k must have perfect recall. The following lemma con…rms this intuition.
Lemma 1. If an extensive game satis…es (RI) then it satis…es (PR).
Proof. Fix any
is not satis…ed, then there must exist x 1 ; x 2 2 X k and t 1 ; t 2 2 T such that x i ! c i t i ; t i -x 0 i for each i = 1; 2 and c 1 6 = c 2 : Since each node has exactly one immediate predecessor, then the paths from x 1 to x 0 1 and from x 2 to x 0 2 must di¤er. As a result, there must exist t 0 1 ; t 0 2 2 T such that t 0 i ! c 0 i x 0 i for each i = 1; 2 and c 0 1 6 = c 0 2 : This contradicts (RI).
Although condition (RI) guarantees that every time when a player is called upon to move she needs to make a conjecture about her opponent's moves in only one immediately preceding information set, still it might not su¢ ce to ensure dynamic consistency. The following example illustrates this point.
Example 3. The game in Figure 5 satis…es (RI). In this game, player 1 moves at H 11 ; H 12 and H 13 while player 2 moves at H 21 : A distinct feature of this game is that player 1's choice at H 11 in ‡uences her information …ltration F: In particular, F is given by (F 1 ; F 2 ) where F 1 = fA; B; Cg and F 2 = ffAg; fB; Cgg if she chooses a; and it is given by (F 0 1 ; F 0 2 ) where F 0 1 = F 1 and F 0 2 = ffA; Bg; fCgg if she chooses b: The dynamic consistency fails in this example because the requirement that player 2's strategy B 2 = B H 21 is rectangular with respect to the …ltration (F 1 ; F 2 ) is incompatible with the requirement that it is rectangular with respect to the …ltration (F 0 1 ; F 0 2 ): To show this, consider Figure 6 which gives a two-dimensional representation of any probability measure in B 2 : In the …gure, the horizontal axis corresponds to the probability of state C; denoted by C ; while the vertical axis corresponds to the probability of state B; denoted by B : By applying a similar argument as the one in Example 2, it can be shown that typical sets which are rectangular relative to the …ltrations (F 1 ; F 2 ) and (F 0 1 ; F 0 2 ) would be given by the trapezia QY JP and V T SU; respectively. The …gure makes it clear that the set B 2 cannot satisfy both Guided by this example, we impose another condition which we call 'Consistency of Information Filtration'(hereafter, 'CIF').
(CIF) For each player k 6 = l; all nodes x 1 ; x 2 ; b x 1 ; b x 2 2 X k and x; b x 2 X l and for all choices c 1 and
Condition (CIF) states that if player k cannot distinguish between two choices of player l at one node of the immediately preceding information set then the same must hold true for every other node in that information set. It thereby implies that there is no reason for player k to base her conjecture, as to what player l did right before the time when she is called upon to move, on the history of play up to that time (hence, the term 'Consistency of Information Filtration').
In what follows, we shall restrict attention to the class of extensive games that satisfy conditions (RI) and (CIF). This class is su¢ ciently more restrictive than the class of extensive games with imperfect information but is su¢ ciently less restrictive than the class of extensive games with perfect information.
As is explained above, condition (RI) implies that what matters for player k upon arriving at the information set H k is the knowledge of the probability distribution over player l's choices at the immediately preceding information set
In turn, condition (CIF) implies that the partition of the event space which comprises all the choices available at H l is invariable across the nodes in H l :
Denote by H k (H l ) the collection of H k 's which are immediate successors of H l and by C k (H l ) C(H l ) the set of choices in H l which lead to H k 2 H k (H l ); i.e.,
Also, denote by C O (H l ) the set of choices in H l which lead to terminal nodes, i.e.,
Thus, at any point of time before the game reaches any H k 2 H k (H l ) the Since, by assumption, each player k is averse to uncertainty created by her opponents playing the strategy pro…le B k ; her ex ante expected utility from using strategy k 2 B k is given by
where P z ( k ; k ) is the probability of reaching a terminal node z 2 Z induced by the strategy pro…le ( k ; k ):
De…nition 15 Given the opponents' strategy pro…le B k ; the strategy b k is ex ante optimal for player k if U k ( b k ; B k ) U k ( k ; B k ) for all k 2 B k :
Denote by H k + the continuation strategy induced by k at H k and all the information sets that follow H k ; by B k; H k + the components of B k that correspond to the information sets that follow H k ; and by H k the set-valued beliefs of player k over the histories in H k : Given H k and B k;H k + ; de…ne player k's expected utility from playing H k + at H k as
where P z ( H k + ; H k ; k;H k + jH k ) is the probability of reaching a terminal node z 2 Z conditional on H k :
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we make three primary points. First, we prove that …nite extensive games with objective ambiguity can equivalently be analyzed using ambiguous behavioral and ambiguous mixed strategies, as long as the latter strategies satisfy the rectangularity condition. In contrast to the standard Kuhn's Theorem, this result does not rely on the assumption of perfect recall. However, it applies only to the ex ante choice of ambiguous strategies and, as such, it cannot be relied upon in ensuring dynamic consistency. Second, we show by means of examples that even in games satisfying perfect recall it might be impossible to achieve dynamic consistency if one maintains the assumptions that players choose their (ambiguous) strategies in a non-cooperative way. Finally, we argue that, in order to ensure dynamic consistency, one must impose restrictions not only on the ex ante choice of ambiguous strategies but also on the structure of a game. Overall, our results lay the foundation for studying equilibrium notions in games where players are capable of creating ambiguity.
